What options does the US have to sweep Hormuz mines?
To make Hormuz navigable again, the United States is expected to deploy a mix of airborne and seaborne mine countermeasure assets, supported by allied navies.
When Donald Trump claimed, “They have no navy. They have no air force It’s all gone,” few would have imagined that a country with no “effective” naval presence could exploit a strategic chokepoint like the Strait of Hormuz. Yet, Iran has done precisely that.
Iran has repeatedly claimed that it has laid mines in the Strait, while also asserting that vessels can pass safely if they adhere to a designated route.
As narrow as 34 km at its thinnest point, and with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) dispersed and distinct minelayers, Iran has challenged the mighty United States Navy with a heavy armada in the West Asia theatre.
Trump, at the outset, appeared to have underestimated this dynamic, which likely explains why Washington even offered Tehran limited sanctions relief on its oil. However, following the collapse of the Islamabad talks on Saturday, the US position has hardened. Washington now opposes Iran’s alternative routing mechanism, alleging that vessels are effectively paying a “toll” to Tehran to transit through Hormuz.
Washington appears increasingly eager to resolve the Hormuz crisis. With Trump threatening to block Iranian ports, the US Navy has begun “setting conditions” for mine clearance operations in the perilous strait.
India Today’s Open Source Intelligence team analyses available reporting on the mines Iran is believed to have deployed in the Strait of Hormuz, and the array of tools and mine countermeasure capabilities the US Navy could deploy to locate and clear them from contested waters.
On April 11, two guided-missile destroyers, USS Michael Murphy (DDG 112) and USS Frank E. Peterson (DDG 121), transited the Strait of Hormuz and operated in the “Arabian Gulf” as part of a broader mission to ensure “it is fully cleared,” according to United States Central Command.
The movement of the USS Michael Murphy, a key asset of the Navy, was noted on ship-tracking websites on Saturday. India Today independently tracked the US vessel ‘US GOV VESSEL 112’ inside the Strait of Hormuz. The vessel’s Maritime Mobile Service Identifier (MMSI) is ’303966000. All ships worldwide have a unique, non-overlapping MMSI number. USS Michael Murphy also shares the same MMSI.
It is a typical ‘Aegis destroyer’ equipped with the capability to intercept ballistic missiles and is referred to as an ‘all-purpose combat ship’ capable of engaging in ‘anti-air, anti-ship, and anti-submarine operations’ involving missiles and drones.
Here's a 3D animation illustrating Iran’s mines in Hormuz and how the US will neutralise them?
India Today analysis suggests that Iran has deployed at least three types of mines in Hormuz: moored, drifting, and bottom. While the United States Navy remains the world’s undisputed naval superpower, studies indicate it faces operational limitations in neutralising some of the mines laid by Tehran.
Moored mines
Moored mines, anchored to the seabed but set to float just below a ship’s keel, typically around 5 to 15 meters, are among the most effective threats in Hormuz. They trigger on contact or a vessel’s magnetic, acoustic, or pressure signature, exploiting the strait’s narrow and predictable shipping lanes.
To counter this, a US Navy clearance effort would rely on a layered airborne approach. The AN AES 1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) mounted on MH-60 Seahawk helicopters uses Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR). This laser-based sensing method measures reflected light to detect, classify, and localise surface and near-surface moored mines across wide areas in confined waters.
Once identified, neutralisation is carried out using the AN ASQ 235 Airborne Mine Neutralisation System, AMNS, known as Archerfish, which deploys expendable, remotely operated underwater destructors equipped with sonar and video to locate and detonate the mine, providing a rapid clearance capability against moored and proud mines in chokepoint operations.
Another option the US has to neutralise the threat of moored mines is to deploy the AN SLQ 48 V Mine Neutralization System from dedicated mine countermeasure platforms such as Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships.
This tethered, remotely operated system is guided to the mine’s mooring cable, where onboard cutters sever the tether, causing the mine to rise to the surface for disposal by gunfire or explosive ordnance teams. In more advanced modes, it can attach explosive destructors to the cable, which are then triggered acoustically from the ship to neutralise the mine in place, providing a precise and controlled clearance capability against moored mine threats.
However, the system is often described as dated technology and has not seen operational use since Operation Desert Storm, from the bombing campaign against Iraq by the American-led liberation of Kuwait in 1991. This reflects its limitations and the reduced prioritisation within the US Navy in recent years. Several Avenger-class ships, once deployed in Bahrain, have since been decommissioned. The US now reportedly operates only four, USS Patriot MCM 7, USS Pioneer MCM 9, USS Warrior MCM 10, and USS Chief MCM 14, all currently stationed in Sasebo, Japan.
To compensate for the resulting gap in Bahrain, littoral combat ships such as USS Tulsa, USS Santa Barbara, and USS Canberra were forward deployed to the region, explicitly intended to offset the reduced mine countermeasure presence following the decommissioning of Avenger-class mine hunters last year.
Drifting mines
Drifting mines are the other near-surface threat Iran might have deployed. Unlike moored, these are not anchored and move freely with currents and wind, making them unpredictable and capable of entering shipping lanes without warning. Their strength lies in randomness and ease of deployment, though they lack control and can drift beyond intended zones.
To counter them, the US can rely on wide area surveillance and clearance, using helicopters, drones, and mine countermeasure vessels to spot floating threats, followed by explosive ordnance teams or remotely operated systems to neutralise them, while tracking currents to anticipate drift and contain the risk.
Bottom and buried mines
Bottom mines rest directly on the seabed, while buried mines are concealed under layers of sand or sediment, making them far harder to detect. Unlike moored mines, both are typically influence-based and are designed to strike high-value ships moving through shallow, confined waters like Hormuz.
To counter this, a US Navy clearance effort relies on subsurface minehunting systems such as the AN AQS 20 sonar to detect, classify, and precisely locate mines on or buried in the seabed. This is reinforced by the Knifefish Unmanned Undersea Vehicle, a dedicated mine countermeasure platform deployed from Littoral Combat Ships, designed specifically to detect, classify, and identify buried mines in high clutter underwater environments while operating ahead of the host ship to keep crews outside the minefield.
Once confirmed, neutralisation is carried out through follow-on systems such as the Airborne Mine Neutralisation System or by Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams, which conduct close-in operations to place charges and destroy the mine, ensuring controlled clearance in complex seabed conditions.
However, a study by the US-based think tank, Stimson Center, claims that the United States Navy’s neglect of mine countermeasures is now a “critical liability”. The United States has just four dedicated mine countermeasure ships left, all in Japan. Its Littoral Combat Ship-based solution is “delayed, unproven, and limited”, with only three ships equipped and “never tested in combat”. The MH-60S Seahawk helicopter can detect only “shallow, near-surface mines” and would be “highly vulnerable” without air superiority. Meanwhile, next-generation uncrewed systems remain “years away”, leaving the United States facing a threat it “did not prioritise and is not prepared for”.
The US has air, surface, and underwater systems in place, but with some ageing platforms, the real question is: can mine clearance succeed, given the capabilities and limitations?
When Donald Trump claimed, “They have no navy. They have no air force It’s all gone,” few would have imagined that a country with no “effective” naval presence could exploit a strategic chokepoint like the Strait of Hormuz. Yet, Iran has done precisely that.
Iran has repeatedly claimed that it has laid mines in the Strait, while also asserting that vessels can pass safely if they adhere to a designated route.
As narrow as 34 km at its thinnest point, and with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) dispersed and distinct minelayers, Iran has challenged the mighty United States Navy with a heavy armada in the West Asia theatre.
Trump, at the outset, appeared to have underestimated this dynamic, which likely explains why Washington even offered Tehran limited sanctions relief on its oil. However, following the collapse of the Islamabad talks on Saturday, the US position has hardened. Washington now opposes Iran’s alternative routing mechanism, alleging that vessels are effectively paying a “toll” to Tehran to transit through Hormuz.
Washington appears increasingly eager to resolve the Hormuz crisis. With Trump threatening to block Iranian ports, the US Navy has begun “setting conditions” for mine clearance operations in the perilous strait.
India Today’s Open Source Intelligence team analyses available reporting on the mines Iran is believed to have deployed in the Strait of Hormuz, and the array of tools and mine countermeasure capabilities the US Navy could deploy to locate and clear them from contested waters.
On April 11, two guided-missile destroyers, USS Michael Murphy (DDG 112) and USS Frank E. Peterson (DDG 121), transited the Strait of Hormuz and operated in the “Arabian Gulf” as part of a broader mission to ensure “it is fully cleared,” according to United States Central Command.
The movement of the USS Michael Murphy, a key asset of the Navy, was noted on ship-tracking websites on Saturday. India Today independently tracked the US vessel ‘US GOV VESSEL 112’ inside the Strait of Hormuz. The vessel’s Maritime Mobile Service Identifier (MMSI) is ’303966000. All ships worldwide have a unique, non-overlapping MMSI number. USS Michael Murphy also shares the same MMSI.
It is a typical ‘Aegis destroyer’ equipped with the capability to intercept ballistic missiles and is referred to as an ‘all-purpose combat ship’ capable of engaging in ‘anti-air, anti-ship, and anti-submarine operations’ involving missiles and drones.
Here's a 3D animation illustrating Iran’s mines in Hormuz and how the US will neutralise them?
India Today analysis suggests that Iran has deployed at least three types of mines in Hormuz: moored, drifting, and bottom. While the United States Navy remains the world’s undisputed naval superpower, studies indicate it faces operational limitations in neutralising some of the mines laid by Tehran.
Moored mines
Moored mines, anchored to the seabed but set to float just below a ship’s keel, typically around 5 to 15 meters, are among the most effective threats in Hormuz. They trigger on contact or a vessel’s magnetic, acoustic, or pressure signature, exploiting the strait’s narrow and predictable shipping lanes.
To counter this, a US Navy clearance effort would rely on a layered airborne approach. The AN AES 1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) mounted on MH-60 Seahawk helicopters uses Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR). This laser-based sensing method measures reflected light to detect, classify, and localise surface and near-surface moored mines across wide areas in confined waters.
Once identified, neutralisation is carried out using the AN ASQ 235 Airborne Mine Neutralisation System, AMNS, known as Archerfish, which deploys expendable, remotely operated underwater destructors equipped with sonar and video to locate and detonate the mine, providing a rapid clearance capability against moored and proud mines in chokepoint operations.
Another option the US has to neutralise the threat of moored mines is to deploy the AN SLQ 48 V Mine Neutralization System from dedicated mine countermeasure platforms such as Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships.
This tethered, remotely operated system is guided to the mine’s mooring cable, where onboard cutters sever the tether, causing the mine to rise to the surface for disposal by gunfire or explosive ordnance teams. In more advanced modes, it can attach explosive destructors to the cable, which are then triggered acoustically from the ship to neutralise the mine in place, providing a precise and controlled clearance capability against moored mine threats.
However, the system is often described as dated technology and has not seen operational use since Operation Desert Storm, from the bombing campaign against Iraq by the American-led liberation of Kuwait in 1991. This reflects its limitations and the reduced prioritisation within the US Navy in recent years. Several Avenger-class ships, once deployed in Bahrain, have since been decommissioned. The US now reportedly operates only four, USS Patriot MCM 7, USS Pioneer MCM 9, USS Warrior MCM 10, and USS Chief MCM 14, all currently stationed in Sasebo, Japan.
To compensate for the resulting gap in Bahrain, littoral combat ships such as USS Tulsa, USS Santa Barbara, and USS Canberra were forward deployed to the region, explicitly intended to offset the reduced mine countermeasure presence following the decommissioning of Avenger-class mine hunters last year.
Drifting mines
Drifting mines are the other near-surface threat Iran might have deployed. Unlike moored, these are not anchored and move freely with currents and wind, making them unpredictable and capable of entering shipping lanes without warning. Their strength lies in randomness and ease of deployment, though they lack control and can drift beyond intended zones.
To counter them, the US can rely on wide area surveillance and clearance, using helicopters, drones, and mine countermeasure vessels to spot floating threats, followed by explosive ordnance teams or remotely operated systems to neutralise them, while tracking currents to anticipate drift and contain the risk.
Bottom and buried mines
Bottom mines rest directly on the seabed, while buried mines are concealed under layers of sand or sediment, making them far harder to detect. Unlike moored mines, both are typically influence-based and are designed to strike high-value ships moving through shallow, confined waters like Hormuz.
To counter this, a US Navy clearance effort relies on subsurface minehunting systems such as the AN AQS 20 sonar to detect, classify, and precisely locate mines on or buried in the seabed. This is reinforced by the Knifefish Unmanned Undersea Vehicle, a dedicated mine countermeasure platform deployed from Littoral Combat Ships, designed specifically to detect, classify, and identify buried mines in high clutter underwater environments while operating ahead of the host ship to keep crews outside the minefield.
Once confirmed, neutralisation is carried out through follow-on systems such as the Airborne Mine Neutralisation System or by Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams, which conduct close-in operations to place charges and destroy the mine, ensuring controlled clearance in complex seabed conditions.
However, a study by the US-based think tank, Stimson Center, claims that the United States Navy’s neglect of mine countermeasures is now a “critical liability”. The United States has just four dedicated mine countermeasure ships left, all in Japan. Its Littoral Combat Ship-based solution is “delayed, unproven, and limited”, with only three ships equipped and “never tested in combat”. The MH-60S Seahawk helicopter can detect only “shallow, near-surface mines” and would be “highly vulnerable” without air superiority. Meanwhile, next-generation uncrewed systems remain “years away”, leaving the United States facing a threat it “did not prioritise and is not prepared for”.
The US has air, surface, and underwater systems in place, but with some ageing platforms, the real question is: can mine clearance succeed, given the capabilities and limitations?
