China being crafty in Sino-India war

A 1954 photograph of Nehru with Chou en Lai in BeijingThe Art of War was written by the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu in 500 B.C., and is still considered a gospel for war and strategic thinking in organisations around the globe, and if the recently declassified CIA documents are to be believed, the Chinese mastered it perfectly in the run up to the 1962 Sino-India war. The war remains one of the most humiliating defeats for India that affected the Indian morale and damaged India's efforts to present itself as an emerging power. It also pointed to the lapses on the part of the Indian political and military leadership that led to the war. CIA REPORT "The Chinese diplomatic effort was a five-year masterpiece of guile, executed and probably planned in large part by Chou en Lai. Chou played on Nehru's Asian, anti-imperialist mental attitude, his proclivity to temporise and his sincere desire for an amicable Sino-Indian relationship." "Nehru told a source: In certain circumstances I would not have minded giving away a little bit of Ladakh, presumably the Aksai Plain. But I do not want the Chinese to take me for a sucker. Chou en Lai has lied to me so often that I do not feel like trusting him anymore."Delhi has maintained silence and has not reacted and the Chinese have trashed the analysis, but the CIA papers present an American insight into the difficult relationship between the two neighbours India and China. Written soon after the 1962 crisis by a senior analyst, the report uses both documents and discussions in the public domain as well as private assessments to arrive at its conclusions. Its overall thrust, which is not inimical to India's analysis of the debacle, is an exposition of how Chinese Premier Chou en Lai tried to deceive the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, through a strategy of persuasion and coercion.The question though remains as to why China, despite Nehru's Hindi-Chini bhai bhai monologues, betrayed India, and went to war with it in 1962? According to the CIA analysis it seems that China considered India to be a long term threat and the Chinese leadership wanted to deliver a major blow to India's political and military leadership, and demonstrate its big power status. The paper quotes the Chinese President Liao Shao Chi in his discussions with the Swedish ambassador in 1963 as saying: "The attack had taught India a lesson and that for future Nehru and the Indians must be taught that they can not change the border status quo by force." Liao earlier told a Colombo conference that "China was a great power and had to punish India once?China really can't accept India's 32 INDIA TODAY u JULY 16, 2007 diplomacy attitude that of a feeling of superiority to the Chinese."More than that it was Nehru's personal prestige as a leading Asian leader that played on the Chinese strategic thinking and the paper argues that one of the Chinese leaders' priorities was to seriously damage Nehru's prestige and credibility. Interestingly, the papers reveal the Chinese mindset was aimed at humiliating the Indians. According to an Indian foreign office note of 1959 quoted by the CIA: "The Vice Foreign Minister indulged in personal attacks against Indian Prime Minister Nehru, Defense Minister Krishna Menon and Secretary-General R.K. Nehru?Liao charged the Prime Minister of India with dishonest dealing." In fact, when the Secretary General to the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) R.K. Nehru went to Beijing, he was badly humiliated by the Chinese. The papers say: "The MEA Secretary-General, R.K. Nehru was scolded like a small boy by Lio Shao-Chi in July 1961 for coming to China only to demand a Chinese withdrawal."While on one hand the Chinese played on Nehru, they also used the Indian communists to discredit him.As the papers reveal: "Chinese diplomats were tasked to play up through the Indian communists that Nehru was pro US. He is Kennedy's lawyer, a Chinese diplomat told a senior Indian communist." The papers also disclose that Nehru wanted to have a deal on Aksai Chin, in exchange of the Indian ownership of Arunachal Pradesh, which, interestingly, continues to be a bone of contention. "For a while in fall (autumn) 1959 Nehru seemed to be preparing the Indian public for cession of the Aksai Plain (Aksai Chin) to the Chinese in exchange for Indian ownership of the NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh), but this view was opposed by some leaders in the Congress party." Battle Lines Mao with Nehru1949: India recognises the People's Republic of China. 1950: India opposes UN resolutions branding China as an aggressor in the Korean war. 1954: China and India sign Panchsheel treaty 1955: India objects to the inclusion of a portion of northern frontier on the official map of China. 1956: Chou en Lai visits India for the second time. The border question is formally raised. Nikita khrushchev1958: India objects to inclusion of parts of Assam and NEFA as part of Chinese territories in its maps.1959: Dalai Lama escapes from Tibet, India gives asylum. China refuses to accept the McMohan line. Chinese troops kill nine Indian soldiers and capture 10 in Aksai Chin. 1960: Pushed by Khrushchev, Chou en Lai meets Nehru in Delhi. Talks end in a deadlock.1961: Border skirmishes intensify. 1962: China captures Bomdilla and then announces an unilateral ceasefire. 1962: Colombo proposals negotiated between Nehru and Chou en Lai.The papers also provide some insights into the Tibetan issue, which has often been seen as a leveraging point for India vis-a-vis China.However even though Nehru provided political asylum to Dalai Lama and his supporters, despite Chinese protests in 1959, they also indicate this uneasiness with hosting the Dalai Lama. Did Nehru want to shun the Tibetan cause, and ask the Dalai Lama to leave; the report says that he had privately said so. "For Nehru, who on the one hand was compelled by the presence of Dalai Lama on Indian soil to defend him and on the other hand was reluctant to further strain Sino-Indian relations, he told the Tibetan leader to limit his activities in India to religious affairs, and Indian officials were probably reflecting Nehru's real anxiety when they stated privately that the government would not be sorry to see the Dalai leave the country," the report claims.India's military miscalculations are also much in evidence. The CIA papers reveal that the Indians were caught on the wrong foot and had completely miscalculated their strength vis-a-vis the Chinese. After the failure of talks, Indians had adopted a forward policy of establishing as many frontier posts along the disputed border resulting in many clashes with the Chinese army.During this period, General B.M. Kaul, the then chief of general staff, told the US ambassador John Galbraith "that the Chinese were not operating from strength; the Indian Army viewed the Chinese as set in a 'mood' for weakness and the Indian policy was to take maximum advantage of this mood by establishing maximum posts ?Indian army is not in a mood to be pushed around."Dalai Lama with bodyguards after fleeing LhasaBut the military assessment proved to be inaccurate and according to the CIA's account of the Indian Cabinet meeting held on August 1, 1962 the then defence minister V.K. Krishna Menon said, "Indian military position in Ladakh were untenable, Indian forward posts would be wiped out and the Chinese could, if they desired, push the Indians far beyond their 1960 claim."The papers also comment on the role of the Soviet Union, which was a strong friend of India and its leader Nikita Khrushchev. Even though the then Soviet Union did not cast its lot with China despite the Chinese attempts to get Moscow on board citing the Communist card, Indian establishment was unimpressed by the Russian role. "Indian Foreign Secretary S. Dutt told an US official that Khrushchev was no help with the Chinese at all." The CIA papers are surprisingly blank on the US approach and role it played during this crucial period. CIA REPORT "For Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who was reluctant to further strain Sino-Indian relations, asylum and sympathy constituted the practical limit of support for the Dalai Lama. He told the Tibetan leader to limit his activities in India to religious affairs and Indian officials were probably reflecting Nehru's real anxiety when they stated privately that the Government would not be sorry to see the Dalai Lama leave the country."Despite the obvious drawbacks, some analysts believe that the papers do have a relevance in the contemporary perspective. "The Sino-India war of 1962 and the Chinese betrayal of Nehru points to one thing that the Chinese can go to any length for territorial gains from their neighbours; they did that then in 1962, and even now they claim Arunachal Pradesh as their own territory despite an agreement that settled populations will not be disturbed," says former Indian foreign secretary, S.K. Singh, who is now the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh."These papers provide yet another reminder of why we can't trust the Chinese. They can go back on their word. On the border issue, we need to be careful while negotiating with them," cautions strategic analyst Brahma Chellaney. However, others like Vinod Khanna, a former Indian ambassador and director, Institute of Chinese Studies, says: "There is nothing that is startlingly new in these papers. India and China are two mature powers and are not going to be rattled by CIA writings of 40 years ago." Thereby hangs a tale.Published By: AtMigration Published On: Jul 16, 2007 00:00 IST--- ENDS ---