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<div class="itg-mosimage"><div class="itgimage"><amp-img  src="https://akm-img-a-in.tosshub.com/sites/media2/indiatoday/images/stories/1981November/iaf_102613041806.jpg" alt = "" height="425" width="650" class="" layout="responsive"></amp-img></div>Dassault's Mirage 2000: Indecent haste?</div>Of late, India's major defence buys have started to increasingly resemble a Rubik's Cube of puzzling and complex moves with no discernible pattern in sight. And, not surprisingly, each purchase has been engulfed in an ever-increasing tidal wave of controversy. Nowhere is this more dramatically demonstrated than in the country's panicky and unceasing efforts to police its supposedly threatened skies.<br><br>In 1979, India gave Britain's aviation industry a new lease of life by signing the ill-starred Rs 1,200 crore Jaguar deal, the single biggest defence purchase the country had made. Then, barely a year later, the record was broken by the still-secret defence package deal with the Soviets worth Rs 1,280 crore which saw the MiG-23 making its debut in Indian air space.<br><br>Next fortnight, slightly over a year since the Soviet deal, Mrs Gandhi will fly to Paris to sign yet another deal for the acquisition of the Mirage 2000, a deal that is estimated to be in the region of a staggering Rs 5,000 crore - Rs 500 crore more than the entire defence budget for the current year.<br><br>However, it is not the cost factor that threatens to turn the Mirage deal into the biggest-ever controversy involving a defence purchase, but the Machiavellian manner in which the deal was forcibly pushed through and the strategic implications of the Mirage acquisition.<br><br>Only the blinkered can ignore the highly significant fact that Mrs Gandhi will be signing on the dotted line of the Mirage contract before Parliament starts its winter session. In fact, the Mirage deal has not featured at all in Parliament deliberations so far.<br><br>In retrospect, however, that is hardly surprising considering the mysterious manner in which the entire Mirage contract originated and was brought to its final stage. Last week, Janata Party MP Subramaniam Swamy spelt out some of the myriad questions that are bound to be asked once Parliament opens.<br><br>Apart from pointing out that Parliament had not been taken into confidence, Swamy stated that the deal "had a strong smell of kickbacks" and also pointed to the manner in which the deal was negotiated by detouring traditional channels.<br><b><br>Tight Aid: </b>Though Swamy had obviously received his information from concerned sources, the limited nature of the information and the fact that his is a solitary voice of dissent is hardly likely to create the sort of ripples that are certain to be activated once more details emerge.<br><br>But even at this stage, and despite the strenuous efforts of South Block to clamp a tight lid on the Mirage deal, there is enough evidence to tar the Mirage contract with a far more controversial brush than any previous defence contract.<br><br>Top level sources have confirmed that the Mirage purchase was pushed through with indecent haste and in the teeth of some opposition from the Indian Air Force (IAF). On October 16, the Cabinet, after a hurried meeting, informed the IAF top brass that a decision to purchase the Mirage had been taken.<br><br>That, however, was merely a formality. The Mirage deal had been in the pipeline for over two years now (India Today, August 1-15, 1980) has the IAF has long since abandoned efforts to oppose the deal since enough hints were dropped that a political decision had been made and the deal involved much more than just the Mirage purchase.<br><br>In fact, the IAF itself was kept pretty much in the dark as far as the Mirage deal was concerned. In an interview to the editor of<i>Organiser</i>shortly after the Jaguar deal was signed, the then air chief, Air Marshal Idris Latif stated that the Jaguar was the start of one series while the Mirage was the end of a series. Obviously, Latif was not enamoured of the Mirage.<br><br>Later, shortly after taking over from Latif last September, Air Marshal Dilbagh Singh made no mention at all of the proposed Mirage acquisition when asked about the counter to Pakistan's F-16 purchase. That was a month after the French Government, in characteristic style, had already leaked the news confirming India's purchase of the Mirage.<br><br>Even after the confirmation, South Block has maintained a strange silence on the Mirage deal. Defence Ministry officials refuse to comment on the deal except to describe reports that India will be acquiring 150 Mirages as "way off target".<br><br>That, however. is only further confirmation that the Mirage deal has a peculiar smell to it. Intelligence sources had indicated that 150 was the magic figure (India Today, October 31) and this has been repeatedly confirmed by top aviation and defence publications quoting French sources.<br><br>In April 1981, Marcel Dassault himself stated that India was buying 150 Mirages and there was no denial from New Delhi. Ironically enough, Mrs Gandhi did not deny the Mirage purchase when questioned about it by an Australian correspondent during a press conference in Canberra early last month. All she used was the now-hackneyed defence about India having to counter the F-16 threat from Pakistan.<br><b><br>Convenience:</b>However, even that is nothing short of eyewash. The Mirage deal was already well on its way when the F-16 purchase hit the headlines and the only connection between the two is one of convenience. Retracing the messy footprints of the Mirage deal is a revealing exercise and indicates that there is much more to the deal than meets the eye.<br><br>The Mirage offer was first made in April 1979 by the French ambassador in New Delhi. The significance lay in its timing - the offer was made exactly one day before India signed the Jaguar contract. The motivation behind the offer was effectively concealed in the convulsions that had taken place in the French aircraft industry. The Jaguar was an Anglo-French product designed jointly by British Aerospace and the French aircraft firm of Breguet.<br><br>Breguet, however, was in a financial mess and was bought over by his main competitor, Dassault, owned by aircraft designer Marcel Dassault. The Mirage series is Dassault's personal design and he had no moral qualms about abandoning Breguet's Jaguar commitments in favour of pushing his own personal brainchild - the Mirage.<br><br>Neither, apparently, did the French Government who by then had virtually nationalised the French aircraft industry including Dassault. That was when the French Government with Dassault's blessings, decided to scuttle India's Jaguar programme and replace it with the Mirage 2000.<br><br>The next move in the Mirage chessgame was also one in which timing played a crucial role. In January, 1980, barely days after Mrs Gandhi returned to power, the then French president Valery Giscard d'Estaing flew to New Delhi for what was officially described as a "courtesy visit" but was, in actual fact, official arm-twisting for the Mirage deal. Not that very much arm-twisting was required.<br><br>The Gandhi Government was leery of the Jaguar deal simply because it had been signed by the Janata Government and partly because of the intense and sustained controversy it had generated. Naturally, the French offered an accompanying package of goodies along with the Mirage, including a quantum increase in trade, technology transfers and, most important, according to high-level sources, enriched uranium for Tarapur.<br><br><b>Next Series:</b>The next series of events was once again a flagrant transgression of established practice. Unlike in the Jaguar deal, where other comparable aircraft had been evaluated before the final decision was taken, the Mirage 2000 had no such preliminary constraints.<br><br>Simultaneously, a series of political moves were initiated by Mrs Gandhi. Minister of State for Defence C. P. N. Singh was sidelined to another less-important ministry and shortly after, both the Defence Secretary, K.P.A. Menon, and the Defence Production Secretary, A.B. Malik, were transferred as well. "It is not clear whether they were shifted because they opposed the Mirage deal or were caught with their hands in the till but there was obviously a connection," says a Defence Ministry source.<br><br>Meanwhile, political changes were taking place in France with d'Estaing's exit and the formation of a socialist government under President Mitterrand. The Mitterrand Government lost no time in picking up where the previous government had left off as far as pushing the Mirage was concerned. Mitterrand's brother.<br><br>General Jacques Mitterrand, who left India last week after a fortnight-long visit was appointed head of the French aeronautical industry, which includes Dassault. While Mitterrand was extolling the virtues of the Mirage in India, a high-level defence team led by Defence Secretary P.K. Kaul and Dilbagh Singh were in France putting the finishing touches to the Mirage deal and it now only awaits Mrs Gandhi's signature.<br><br><b>Real Crux:</b>Apart from the realpolitik behind the Mirage deal, the real crux of the question lies in the strategic implications of the Mirage acquisition by the IAF. Most defence analysts are convinced that India is buying a pig in a poke.<br><br>For one, the Mirage 2000 is still in the prototype stage and the first production machine is not expected, even by French estimates, to be ready before the end of 1983. Even then, the first 100 or so will go to the French Air Force which means that the earliest India can expect delivery is 1985.<br><br>Added to that is the cost factor. The Mirage 2000, according to all available information, will have a price-tag of around Rs 25 crore per unit with an annual escalation clause of 12 per cent. In comparison, the F-16 costs Rs 12 crore while the MiG-25 is even cheaper as is the European multi-role Tornado, which has also been offered to India recently.<br><br>"With that money we could get twice the amount of MiGs which are already under production and are familiar to IAF pilots," argues defence expert Jagan Chawla. Says Ravi Rikhye, another well-established defence analyst, "The fact is that the capabilities of the Mirage 2000 are still relatively unknown and what little we do know is hardly encouraging."<br><br>Rikhye has a valid point. The Mirage 2000 was evaluated by the Pakistan Air Force in September 1980 and they turned it down. So have Australia, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan. It is also no secret that the French Air Force has turned up its nose at the Mirage and much prefers the cheaper Tornado.<br><br>In fact, the French Government has refused to bankroll production of the Mirage 4000 and Dassault is currently negotiating with Saudi Arabia to finance the project in return for uninterrupted supply of Mirage 4000s.<br><br>The 4000, however, is not expected to be ready for production before the end of the decade and Dassault would be in trouble if no takers for the Mirage 2000 could be found. Hence, the unseemly urgency with which the deal was signed with India and the convoluted campaign orchestrated to bring the Indian Government around.<br><br><b>Capability:</b>Even in terms of capability, the Mirage 2000 is not what it is cracked up to be. For one, it is a single-engine aircraft designed for a high altitude interception role. Its SNECMA M53 engine is basically end-of-the-line technology and has proved disappointing. An improved engine is still on the drawing boards.<br><br>Neither is the Mirage 2000 designed for low level operations which makes a mockery of its alleged role as a counter to the F-16s. It has 20 per cent less range compared to the F-16 and the Jaguar and according to available information, has a mere 10-minute combat endurance.<br><br>The engine is essentially a low technology turbofan which is excessively heavy on fuel and uneconomical in a low level combat role. Similarly, its delta wings are a disadvantage in low level operations because of the drag. Another disadvantage in the combat role is the lack of shielding for the infra-red "signature" of the engine which makes it highly vulnerable to heat-seeking missiles.<br><br>The Jaguar, on the other hand, has a highly effective shield for its Adour engines. The single engine is also at an obvious disadvantage against a twin-engined fighter. A twin-engined aircraft can still limp home if one engine is hit or fails while the Mirage 2000 would not have that advantage. It also exposes the aircraft to the ever-present danger of bird hits, a major hazard in Indian skies.<br><b><br>Deficient:</b>According to defence sources, the Mirage 2000 is highly effective in its chosen role - that of a high altitude interceptor. But in any other role, it is sadly deficient. Considering that any major threat in a modern war is almost certain to be mass raids at low levels, the Mirage certainly is not the answer. Added to this is the production problems that are bound to arise. Only 40 Mirages will be bought in a fly-away condition.<br><br>The rest will be either partly or totally manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) which, by all available evidence and its past performance, is inadequately geared to make the jump from Jaguar production (an estimated three aircraft a year) to that of the Mirage which is a totally different design. Additionally, it is widely accepted that the minimum number of aircraft considered feasible for setting up a production line is 200.<br><br>In the case of the Mirage, HAL will be setting up a production line for 64 aircraft while it has done more or less the same for the Jaguar. Even the aircraft production unit at Nasik has established a production line for 85 MiG-21s. That is not taking into account the cost involved in setting up production.<br><br>In fact, the entire defence deal with the French also covers the proposed purchase of advanced twin-rotor Dauphin helicopters which is likely to hike the final price-tag to around Rs 8,000 to Rs 10,000 crore, making it one of the biggest arms deals of the century. In effect, the Indian Government is committing what amounts to twice the entire annual defence budget for an aircraft that is relatively unknown in terms of capability and which will materialise in 1985 at the very earliest.<br><br>By which time the present Government may well be out of office leaving the next government holding the baby. India's defence planners have traditionally indulged themselves in chasing mirages but the latest one could be the biggest and the most elusive yet.<br><div id="tab-link-wrapper-plugin"><div class="authors__container"><div class="authors__by"><div class="authlable">Published By: </div><div class="authdetaisl">AtMigration </div></div><div class="published__on"><div class="authlable">Published On: </div><div class="authdetaisl">Oct 26, 2013 16:50 IST</div></div></div><div class="sendros">--- ENDS ---</div></div>

defence

Defence

<div class="itg-mosimage"><div class="itgimage"><img  title=""  class="" alt="" src="https://akm-img-a-in.tosshub.com/sites/media2/indiatoday/images/stories/1981November/iaf_102613041806.jpg" loading="lazy" /></div>Dassault's Mirage 2000: Indecent haste?</div>Of late, India's major defence buys have started to increasingly resemble a Rubik's Cube of puzzling and complex moves with no discernible pattern in sight. And, not surprisingly, each purchase has been engulfed in an ever-increasing tidal wave of controversy. Nowhere is this more dramatically demonstrated than in the country's panicky and unceasing efforts to police its supposedly threatened skies.<br><br>In 1979, India gave Britain's aviation industry a new lease of life by signing the ill-starred Rs 1,200 crore Jaguar deal, the single biggest defence purchase the country had made. Then, barely a year later, the record was broken by the still-secret defence package deal with the Soviets worth Rs 1,280 crore which saw the MiG-23 making its debut in Indian air space.<br><br>Next fortnight, slightly over a year since the Soviet deal, Mrs Gandhi will fly to Paris to sign yet another deal for the acquisition of the Mirage 2000, a deal that is estimated to be in the region of a staggering Rs 5,000 crore - Rs 500 crore more than the entire defence budget for the current year.<br><br>However, it is not the cost factor that threatens to turn the Mirage deal into the biggest-ever controversy involving a defence purchase, but the Machiavellian manner in which the deal was forcibly pushed through and the strategic implications of the Mirage acquisition.<br><br>Only the blinkered can ignore the highly significant fact that Mrs Gandhi will be signing on the dotted line of the Mirage contract before Parliament starts its winter session. In fact, the Mirage deal has not featured at all in Parliament deliberations so far.<br><br>In retrospect, however, that is hardly surprising considering the mysterious manner in which the entire Mirage contract originated and was brought to its final stage. Last week, Janata Party MP Subramaniam Swamy spelt out some of the myriad questions that are bound to be asked once Parliament opens.<br><br>Apart from pointing out that Parliament had not been taken into confidence, Swamy stated that the deal "had a strong smell of kickbacks" and also pointed to the manner in which the deal was negotiated by detouring traditional channels.<br><b><br>Tight Aid: </b>Though Swamy had obviously received his information from concerned sources, the limited nature of the information and the fact that his is a solitary voice of dissent is hardly likely to create the sort of ripples that are certain to be activated once more details emerge.<br><br>But even at this stage, and despite the strenuous efforts of South Block to clamp a tight lid on the Mirage deal, there is enough evidence to tar the Mirage contract with a far more controversial brush than any previous defence contract.<br><br>Top level sources have confirmed that the Mirage purchase was pushed through with indecent haste and in the teeth of some opposition from the Indian Air Force (IAF). On October 16, the Cabinet, after a hurried meeting, informed the IAF top brass that a decision to purchase the Mirage had been taken.<br><br>That, however, was merely a formality. The Mirage deal had been in the pipeline for over two years now (India Today, August 1-15, 1980) has the IAF has long since abandoned efforts to oppose the deal since enough hints were dropped that a political decision had been made and the deal involved much more than just the Mirage purchase.<br><br>In fact, the IAF itself was kept pretty much in the dark as far as the Mirage deal was concerned. In an interview to the editor of<i>Organiser</i>shortly after the Jaguar deal was signed, the then air chief, Air Marshal Idris Latif stated that the Jaguar was the start of one series while the Mirage was the end of a series. Obviously, Latif was not enamoured of the Mirage.<br><br>Later, shortly after taking over from Latif last September, Air Marshal Dilbagh Singh made no mention at all of the proposed Mirage acquisition when asked about the counter to Pakistan's F-16 purchase. That was a month after the French Government, in characteristic style, had already leaked the news confirming India's purchase of the Mirage.<br><br>Even after the confirmation, South Block has maintained a strange silence on the Mirage deal. Defence Ministry officials refuse to comment on the deal except to describe reports that India will be acquiring 150 Mirages as "way off target".<br><br>That, however. is only further confirmation that the Mirage deal has a peculiar smell to it. Intelligence sources had indicated that 150 was the magic figure (India Today, October 31) and this has been repeatedly confirmed by top aviation and defence publications quoting French sources.<br><br>In April 1981, Marcel Dassault himself stated that India was buying 150 Mirages and there was no denial from New Delhi. Ironically enough, Mrs Gandhi did not deny the Mirage purchase when questioned about it by an Australian correspondent during a press conference in Canberra early last month. All she used was the now-hackneyed defence about India having to counter the F-16 threat from Pakistan.<br><b><br>Convenience:</b>However, even that is nothing short of eyewash. The Mirage deal was already well on its way when the F-16 purchase hit the headlines and the only connection between the two is one of convenience. Retracing the messy footprints of the Mirage deal is a revealing exercise and indicates that there is much more to the deal than meets the eye.<br><br>The Mirage offer was first made in April 1979 by the French ambassador in New Delhi. The significance lay in its timing - the offer was made exactly one day before India signed the Jaguar contract. The motivation behind the offer was effectively concealed in the convulsions that had taken place in the French aircraft industry. The Jaguar was an Anglo-French product designed jointly by British Aerospace and the French aircraft firm of Breguet.<br><br>Breguet, however, was in a financial mess and was bought over by his main competitor, Dassault, owned by aircraft designer Marcel Dassault. The Mirage series is Dassault's personal design and he had no moral qualms about abandoning Breguet's Jaguar commitments in favour of pushing his own personal brainchild - the Mirage.<br><br>Neither, apparently, did the French Government who by then had virtually nationalised the French aircraft industry including Dassault. That was when the French Government with Dassault's blessings, decided to scuttle India's Jaguar programme and replace it with the Mirage 2000.<br><br>The next move in the Mirage chessgame was also one in which timing played a crucial role. In January, 1980, barely days after Mrs Gandhi returned to power, the then French president Valery Giscard d'Estaing flew to New Delhi for what was officially described as a "courtesy visit" but was, in actual fact, official arm-twisting for the Mirage deal. Not that very much arm-twisting was required.<br><br>The Gandhi Government was leery of the Jaguar deal simply because it had been signed by the Janata Government and partly because of the intense and sustained controversy it had generated. Naturally, the French offered an accompanying package of goodies along with the Mirage, including a quantum increase in trade, technology transfers and, most important, according to high-level sources, enriched uranium for Tarapur.<br><br><b>Next Series:</b>The next series of events was once again a flagrant transgression of established practice. Unlike in the Jaguar deal, where other comparable aircraft had been evaluated before the final decision was taken, the Mirage 2000 had no such preliminary constraints.<br><br>Simultaneously, a series of political moves were initiated by Mrs Gandhi. Minister of State for Defence C. P. N. Singh was sidelined to another less-important ministry and shortly after, both the Defence Secretary, K.P.A. Menon, and the Defence Production Secretary, A.B. Malik, were transferred as well. "It is not clear whether they were shifted because they opposed the Mirage deal or were caught with their hands in the till but there was obviously a connection," says a Defence Ministry source.<br><br>Meanwhile, political changes were taking place in France with d'Estaing's exit and the formation of a socialist government under President Mitterrand. The Mitterrand Government lost no time in picking up where the previous government had left off as far as pushing the Mirage was concerned. Mitterrand's brother.<br><br>General Jacques Mitterrand, who left India last week after a fortnight-long visit was appointed head of the French aeronautical industry, which includes Dassault. While Mitterrand was extolling the virtues of the Mirage in India, a high-level defence team led by Defence Secretary P.K. Kaul and Dilbagh Singh were in France putting the finishing touches to the Mirage deal and it now only awaits Mrs Gandhi's signature.<br><br><b>Real Crux:</b>Apart from the realpolitik behind the Mirage deal, the real crux of the question lies in the strategic implications of the Mirage acquisition by the IAF. Most defence analysts are convinced that India is buying a pig in a poke.<br><br>For one, the Mirage 2000 is still in the prototype stage and the first production machine is not expected, even by French estimates, to be ready before the end of 1983. Even then, the first 100 or so will go to the French Air Force which means that the earliest India can expect delivery is 1985.<br><br>Added to that is the cost factor. The Mirage 2000, according to all available information, will have a price-tag of around Rs 25 crore per unit with an annual escalation clause of 12 per cent. In comparison, the F-16 costs Rs 12 crore while the MiG-25 is even cheaper as is the European multi-role Tornado, which has also been offered to India recently.<br><br>"With that money we could get twice the amount of MiGs which are already under production and are familiar to IAF pilots," argues defence expert Jagan Chawla. Says Ravi Rikhye, another well-established defence analyst, "The fact is that the capabilities of the Mirage 2000 are still relatively unknown and what little we do know is hardly encouraging."<br><br>Rikhye has a valid point. The Mirage 2000 was evaluated by the Pakistan Air Force in September 1980 and they turned it down. So have Australia, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan. It is also no secret that the French Air Force has turned up its nose at the Mirage and much prefers the cheaper Tornado.<br><br>In fact, the French Government has refused to bankroll production of the Mirage 4000 and Dassault is currently negotiating with Saudi Arabia to finance the project in return for uninterrupted supply of Mirage 4000s.<br><br>The 4000, however, is not expected to be ready for production before the end of the decade and Dassault would be in trouble if no takers for the Mirage 2000 could be found. Hence, the unseemly urgency with which the deal was signed with India and the convoluted campaign orchestrated to bring the Indian Government around.<br><br><b>Capability:</b>Even in terms of capability, the Mirage 2000 is not what it is cracked up to be. For one, it is a single-engine aircraft designed for a high altitude interception role. Its SNECMA M53 engine is basically end-of-the-line technology and has proved disappointing. An improved engine is still on the drawing boards.<br><br>Neither is the Mirage 2000 designed for low level operations which makes a mockery of its alleged role as a counter to the F-16s. It has 20 per cent less range compared to the F-16 and the Jaguar and according to available information, has a mere 10-minute combat endurance.<br><br>The engine is essentially a low technology turbofan which is excessively heavy on fuel and uneconomical in a low level combat role. Similarly, its delta wings are a disadvantage in low level operations because of the drag. Another disadvantage in the combat role is the lack of shielding for the infra-red "signature" of the engine which makes it highly vulnerable to heat-seeking missiles.<br><br>The Jaguar, on the other hand, has a highly effective shield for its Adour engines. The single engine is also at an obvious disadvantage against a twin-engined fighter. A twin-engined aircraft can still limp home if one engine is hit or fails while the Mirage 2000 would not have that advantage. It also exposes the aircraft to the ever-present danger of bird hits, a major hazard in Indian skies.<br><b><br>Deficient:</b>According to defence sources, the Mirage 2000 is highly effective in its chosen role - that of a high altitude interceptor. But in any other role, it is sadly deficient. Considering that any major threat in a modern war is almost certain to be mass raids at low levels, the Mirage certainly is not the answer. Added to this is the production problems that are bound to arise. Only 40 Mirages will be bought in a fly-away condition.<br><br>The rest will be either partly or totally manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) which, by all available evidence and its past performance, is inadequately geared to make the jump from Jaguar production (an estimated three aircraft a year) to that of the Mirage which is a totally different design. Additionally, it is widely accepted that the minimum number of aircraft considered feasible for setting up a production line is 200.<br><br>In the case of the Mirage, HAL will be setting up a production line for 64 aircraft while it has done more or less the same for the Jaguar. Even the aircraft production unit at Nasik has established a production line for 85 MiG-21s. That is not taking into account the cost involved in setting up production.<br><br>In fact, the entire defence deal with the French also covers the proposed purchase of advanced twin-rotor Dauphin helicopters which is likely to hike the final price-tag to around Rs 8,000 to Rs 10,000 crore, making it one of the biggest arms deals of the century. In effect, the Indian Government is committing what amounts to twice the entire annual defence budget for an aircraft that is relatively unknown in terms of capability and which will materialise in 1985 at the very earliest.<br><br>By which time the present Government may well be out of office leaving the next government holding the baby. India's defence planners have traditionally indulged themselves in chasing mirages but the latest one could be the biggest and the most elusive yet.<br><div id="tab-link-wrapper-plugin"><div class="authors__container"><div class="authors__by"><div class="authlable">Published By: </div><div class="authdetaisl">AtMigration </div></div><div class="published__on"><div class="authlable">Published On: </div><div class="authdetaisl">Oct 26, 2013 16:50 IST</div></div></div><div class="sendros">--- ENDS ---</div></div>

Of late, India's major defence buys have started to increasingly resemble a Rubik's Cube of puzzling and complex moves with no discernible pattern in sight.

India Today

IAF: Chasing a mirage - India Today

India's defence buys start to resemble a Rubik's Cube of puzzling and complex moves

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Celebrations are underway at the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) headquarters in Kolkata as the party claims a historic and clear majority mandate in the West Bengal assembly elections.

BJP workers celebrate historic win in Bengal with Rabindra Sangeet in Kolkata

Early trends in the Tamil Nadu Assembly elections triggered jubilant scenes at Vijay’s residence, with his Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) taking a commanding lead. Over two hours into counting, TVK was ahead in 106 of 234 seats, placing it firmly in front, with the AIADMK-led alliance trailing at 71 and the DMK alliance at 56. A video clip showed Vijay’s family, including his father, celebrating with cheers, hugs and whistles, capturing the moment of what could be a landmark political debut. Security was tightened outside his residence as supporters began gathering. The strong showing has also revived speculation around possible post-poll alignments, despite no pre-poll alliance.

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